On the Design of International Environmental Agreements for Identical and Heterogeneous Developing Countries by Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
Economic Research Institute Study Papers Economics and Finance 
1997 
On the Design of International Environmental Agreements for 
Identical and Heterogeneous Developing Countries 
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri 
Recommended Citation 
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., "On the Design of International Environmental Agreements for Identical and 
Heterogeneous Developing Countries" (1997). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 123. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/123 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Economics and Finance at DigitalCommons@USU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Economic Research 
Institute Study Papers by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
Economic Research Institute Study Paper 
ERI#97-12 
ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS FOR IDENTICAL AND HETEROGENEOUS 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
by 
AMITRAJEETA.BATABYAL 
Department of Economics 
3530 University Boulevard 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84322-3530 
July 1997 
ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS FOR IDENTICAL AND HETEROGENEOUS 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Assistant Professor 
Department of Economics 
3530 University Boulevard 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84322-3530 
The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the author. They are not necessarily 
endorsed by the Department of Economics or by Utah State University. 
Utah State University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to its 
programs and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, 
marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual orientation. 
Information on other titles in this series may be obtained from: Department of Economics, UMC 
3530, Utah State University, Logan, Utah 84322-3530. 
Copyright © 1997 by Amitrajeet A. BatabyaJ. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for noncommercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright 
notice appears on all such copies. 
ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS FOR IDENTICAL AND HETEROGENEOUS 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
ABSTRACT 
In the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, developing countries (DCs) were adamant that in order to 
protect the environment for the future, new institutions were needed which would channel resources 
from the wealthy developed countries to the poor DCs. With this backdrop, I analyze the problem 
faced by an imperfectly informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) who wishes to 
design an International Environmental Agreement (lEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with 
polluting firms in the various DCs, and he must deal with such firms through their governments. 
Further, the SNGA is constrained by limited financial resources available for environmental 
protection. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction, first for the case in which the relevant DCs 
are identical; I then analyze the case of heterogeneous DCs. I find that the monetary transfers 
necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are quite sensitive to both the timing 
of the underlying game and to the existence of collusion. Inter alia, my analysis suggests that IEAs 
are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem arising from national 
sovereignty. However, the success of such IEAs is contingent on the funds available for global 
environmental protection. 
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1. Introduction 
With the passage of time, it has increasingly been recognized that environmental protection 
is a global issue. As noted by Bernauer (1995, p. 354), the scope and significance of this issue have 
been amply demonstrated by the events of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. At this summit, it became 
clear that if the developed countries of the world wanted " . .. the environment to be secured for 
future generations, [then they would] have to radically assist the South in choosing a different road 
to development than the one they [had] currently [been] travelling on" (Rogers 1993, p. 27). Indeed, 
to combat the twin evils of poverty and environmental degradation, developing countries (Des) have 
demanded the transfer of resources and technology from developed countries. In such a contentious 
setting, the success or failure to protect the environment will depend crucially on the ability of 
international institutions to craft effective international environmental agreements (IEAs). 2 Given 
this, a key question becomes "How can international institutions, which necessarily respect the 
principle of state sovereignty, contribute to the solution of difficult global problems?" (Keohane, 
Haas, and Levy 1993, p. 6). This is the main question that I propose to analyze in this paper. 
IThis paper has benefitted from the comments ofLany Karp. I acknowledge financial support from the Faculty 
Research Grant program at Utah State University and from the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State 
University, Logan, UT 84322-4810. Approved as journal paper No. 5028. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2In this paper I shall use the terms IEA and contract interchangeably. 
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On the academic front, researchers have begun to study Issues relating to global 
environmental protection in a systematic manner only very recently. 3 As a result, many specific 
questions remain unanswered. What kinds of pollution abatement patterns can one expect to observe 
in situations in which an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) 
contracts with governments and polluting firms in individual Des? What kinds of monetary 
transfers will be necessary to get sovereign nations to voluntarily participate in IEAs? How does 
the contract, which treats Des as identical, differ from one which acknowledges the heterogeneity 
of Des? How does the SNGAs inability to monitor pollution abatement in the individual countries 
affect the contract design question? Finally, how does the limited availability of funds affect the 
SNGAs contract design question? These are some of the specific questions that I shall address in 
this paper. 
I shall build on the economics of hierarchies to study the global pollution control question 
as a problem in mechanism design. This perspective not only highlights the effect of key 
informational asymmetries on the design of contracts, but it also provides interesting insights into 
the kinds of pollution control arrangements one might expect to observe in an inherently hierarchical 
and noncooperative international environment. Although my analysis is in principle applicable to 
any country, the hierarchical interaction that I shall analyze is particularly relevant to Des; as such, 
the reader should note that it is these countries that I have in mind in all of the subsequent analyses.4 
3See Bernauer (1995) and Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993) for a more detailed corroboration of this claim. 
4The countries I have in mind are those which would be eligible to receive monetary transfers under the Global 
Environmental Facility' s (GEF) standard of per capita income of $4,000 or less. For more details see Rogers (1993, p. 
155). 
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I now discuss the nascent literature on lEAs and then move on to provide a detailed discussion of 
my model. 
2. International Environmental Agreements: A Brief Synopsis 
Barrett (1992, 1994) has modeled lEAs as games between countries. While Barrett's 
analyses are not in the design framework, he makes the important point that for lEAs to work at all, 
they must be self enforcing. Hoel (1992) argues against the institution of uniform emissions 
reduction policies in international agreements, showing that other policies yield higher levels of 
global welfare. Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996) show that a large enough group of environmentally 
conscious countries can make self-financing side payments to a group of less environmentally 
conscious countries so as to produce a stable coalition which leads to lower overall pollution 
emissions. While these papers have certainly advanced our understanding of some aspects of 
" ... the multi-faceted design . .. problem," (Black, Levi, and de Meza 1993, p. 281), many other 
important questions-which I discussed in section I-remain unanswered. As such, I now discuss 
my modeling approach to the lEA design question. 
I shall model the international environment as a multiforked, three-tiered hierarchy. 
Occupying the topmost tier of the hierarchy is the relevant international institution, which I shall call 
a SNGA. This SNGA could be an organization such as the World Bank,5 or the Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD) created in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit. The second and 
5Specifically in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). 
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third tiers of the hierarchy consist of the government and a representative polluting firm in each DC. 
Each fork of the hierarchy corresponds to a single DC, and there are N such forks/countries . 6 
Three-tiered hierarchies have been studied by Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), 
and by Batabyal (1996a, 1996b). Batabyal (1996b) compares two-tiered hierarchies with 
three-tiered hierarchies and shows that the timing of the game played by the relevant players does 
not have a significant bearing on the nature of the lEA that can be designed by a SNGA. However, 
to the best of my knowledge, the problem of designing lEAs for identical and heterogeneous DCs, 
when there are budget balance constraints and when governments and firms within a country may 
collude, has not been studied to date. 
As such, I shall apply the theory of hierarchies to study the design of lEAs, first for identical 
DCs, and then for heterogeneous DCs. The reader should think of the identical DC's case as one 
in which the SNGA seeks to avoid the transaction costs associated with the design of 
country-specific lEAs. As a result, the SNGA holds all DCs, which fall within a particular criterion, 
to identical contractual requirements. As indicated in footnote 4, one such criterion might be the 
GEFs standard of per capita income of$4,000 or less. From the perspective of the SNGA, this case 
of identical DCs involves ex ante contracting.7 In particular, the SNGA is constrained by an ex ante 
budget constraint. This kind of budget constraint makes sense only when all the relevant countries 
6The reader will note that in this modeling scheme, I have conferred on the SNGA, the role of principal. As 
such, there is a distinct asymmetry in the assumed power of the SNGA as opposed to that of governments and firms. 
However, given that I am interested in DCs which typically have limited bargaining power in their dealings with 
international organizations owing to the fact that their monetary contributions to the budgets of such organizations are 
minimal, this hierarchical modeling scheme appears to be appropriate. For more on the power of SNGAs over DCs, see 
Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (199 1). 
7By ex ante I mean contracting which takes place with all parties holding symmetric but imperfect information 
about the pollution abatement technology of firms. By ex post I mean contracting which takes place with the players 
holding asymmetric information about the pollution abatement technology of the same firms. 
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are identical and when there is no aggregate uncertainty. As contrasted to this case, the case in 
which DCs are heterogeneous involves ex post contracting for the SNGA. Here, the SNGAs' actions 
are constrained by ex post budget constraints, and the designed lEAs are country specific. 
The rationale for ex ante and ex post contracting stems from issues including, but not limited 
to, the harmful atmospheric effects of sulphur and/or nitrogen emissions. The actual incidence of 
pollution may be domestic or transboundary.8 The uncertainty in this paper arises from the SNGAs' 
lack of knowledge about the quality of the pollution abatement technology available in each DC. 
This lack of knowledge about abatement technology quality is the source of imperfect and 
asymmetric information. Whereas the firm in the DC always knows the quality of its technology 
and the government does too in some states of nature, the SNGA is never privy to this information. 
The random variable denoting the private information about pollution abatement technology quality 
is uncorrelated across countries. In the ex ante case, this no-correlation assumption does not have 
any impact because all countries are identical, and, hence, my analysis involves the study of the 
SNGAIgovernmentifirm interaction in a single DC. However, in the ex post case, the no-correlation 
assumption means that my analysis of the three-tiered interaction between the SNGA, the 
government, and the polluting firm in one country is independent of the SNGAs' dealings with some 
other country. Hence, without any loss of generality, I shall focus on an arbitrary country, say 
country j, in the finite set of countries. The SNGA's task is to design incentive compatible and 
collusion-proof ex ante and ex post IEAs which can be implemented in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3, I describe the model in detail and 
I study the properties of the first best optimum. In section 4, I study ex ante and ex post contracting, 
8See Crane (1993) and Paarlberg (1993) for a discussion of the relevance of international institutions when the 
incidence of an environmental externality is domestic. 
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with no collusion by the firm and the government. In section 5, I study ex ante and ex post 
contracting with possible collusion by the government and the polluting firm. In addition to the 
identical DC versus heterogeneous DC interpretation of ex ante and ex post contracting that has 
already been provided, the reader should also think of this distinction as one involving liability. This 
issue concerns the potential need for limiting the ex post liability of the players in the various 
nations, in order to get them to voluntarily participate in the contracting process. In other words, 
as contrasted to an ex ante contract, an ex post contract is like a limited liability contract. That is, 
the SNGA limits the maximum loss of the relevant players in the event of an adverse state of nature. 
The reasons for wanting to study collusion between the polluting firm and the LDC 
government are threefold. First, while the DC government participates in the lEA because it 
recognizes the value of such international participation, this government also acts as the polluting 
firm's advocate. This aspect of the problem will give rise to scenarios in which government/firm 
collusion becomes a desirable option.9 Second, the government and the firm receive monetary 
transfers from the SNGA for their roles in abating pollution. Further, both these players know that 
the SNGA cannot monitor their activities owing to sovereignty, or for that matter, enforce the terms 
of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach. As such, there will be circumstances in which there 
are incentives for the government and the firm in each country to collude to maximize the transfers 
received from the SNGA. Third, as Mookherjee and Png (1995) have noted, corruption is an 
endemic part of public life in many DCs. This suggests a need for explicitly modeling the activities 
of potentially corruptible players. Due to these three reasons, an important part of this paper will 
consist of analyzing collusion-proof contracts. 
9See Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible government/fIrm collusion in an 
international setting. 
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3. The Theoretical Framework 
3a. Description of the Model 
Subscript i = 1, 2, 3, 4 will refer to the state of nature, and superscript) = 1, .. . , N will refer 
to the country. 8 denotes the uncertainty about the quality of the pollution abatement technology 
that is currently available; 8 has binary support [8 , 8] , where ° < 8 < 8, and Ll8 == 8 - 8. I 
shall refer to 8 as the low abatement quality parameter and to 8 as the high abatement quality 
parameter. 
The risk-averse firm produces clean air, whose output and value are denoted by XEIR +' The 
firm chooses a level of pollution abatement aE IR+ +' The firms cost of abatement is g(a), where 
g/> 0, and g //> 0, and g(O) = 0. The firm has a differentiable net payoff from pollution abatement 
function B[ Ti - g (a)] with CB [ • ] / aTi E ( 0, 00 ), VTi . r; E IR + is the monetary transfer made by the 
SNGA to the firm for abating pollution in state i. The firm's reservation payoff is Br = B [~. ] , and 
Tr is the reservation transfer. Br and Tr are common knowledge. 
The DC government is risk averse. It has a strictly concave and differentiable utility function 
V(G) , with v' (. )E (0 , 00), VGi . Gi is the monetary transfer made by the SNGA to the government 
for its role in participating in the IEA in state i. The government's reservation utility is 
v;. = V(G r)' where GrEIR + is the reservation transfer, and Vr and Gr are common knowledge. By 
employing a monitoring device, the government receives a signal, s, from the firm regarding its 
private information and then it sends a report, r, to the SNGA indicating what it observed about the 
firm's pollution abatement technology quality parameter. l O In some states of nature, this monitoring 
lOSince the main objective of this paper is not to study domestic monitoring, I shall assume that the use of this 
monitoring device is costless. 
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device malfunctions and hence in these states, the government will be unable to provide the SNGA 
with a useful report. Upon receiving r, the SNGA offers the government a transfer. Making the 
government's central task one of reporting is consistent with the government/SNGA interaction 
proposed for one specific SNGA, the Commission on Sustainable Development. As noted by 
Rogers (1993, p. 310), a key aspect of this interaction involves the 
". . . Commission's . . . considering information provided by governments . . ." 11 
The SNGA is risk neutral and he has a welfare function ~.), which takes the form 
U = Li( ai + 8" - Gi - Ti), } = 1, .. . JV, where} runs over the total number of countries. Clean 
air produced by the firm in country} is xi = a i + &. As stated, the SNGA's welfare is the 
difference between total clean air and the sum of government and firm transfers. In the rest of this 
paper, when there is no possibility of confusion, I shall suppress the country superscript. It should 
be understood that the focus is on country j. The SNGA's contract can only be conditioned on what 
the SNGA observes, i.e., the government's report, r, and the firm's production of clean air, x. 
There are four states of nature, each occurring with probability 11 > 0 , where ~ Pi = 1. 
In the ex ante case, the SNGA, the government, and the firm sign the contract holding symmetric 
but imperfect information about 8 . In the ex post case, the contract is signed after the resolution of 
the uncertainty about 8. The firm always observes 8 before choosing its abatement level. The 
government, on the other hand, mayor may not observe the firm's private information. This 
depends on whether the government's monitoring device functions or malfunctions. As a result, the 
government's signal, s, mayor may not be informative. I can now characterize the four states: 
lIThe reader should note that although the government's utility function is defined only over transfers, this 
government does care about the firm in its country endogenously. This is because the government' s transfer depends 
on the firm 's actions when bribes are allowed. See section 5 for more details. 
* State 1: The firm and the government both observe 8. 
* State 2: The firm observes e and the government observes nothing. 
* State 3 : The firm observes 8 and the government observes nothing. 
* State 4: The firm and the government both observe 8. 
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In state 1, the firm and the government observe the low abatement quality parameter. The 
government's monitoring device works and hence yields useful information. In state 2, the firm 
observes the low abatement quality parameter but the government observes nothing. In this state, 
the government's monitoring device malfunctions. In state 3, the firm observes the high abatement 
quality parameter and the government observes nothing. Once again, the government's monitoring 
device fails. Finally, in state 4, the firm and the government observe the high abatement quality 
parameter. 
The timing of the game between the SNGA, the government and the firm in the ex ante case 
is as follows. First, the SNGA offers a contract to the government and the firm. Second, the firm 
observes e and the government receives its signal s. Third, the firm chooses abatement a. Fourth, 
clean air x is produced by the firm and the government sends its report r to the SNGA indicating 
what it observed. Fifth, the SNGA compensates the government and the firm with transfers G(x,r ) 
and 1( X,lJ . When contracting is ex post, the uncertainty is resolved first and then the contract is 
signed by the players. 
I shall assume that the SNGA can verify the veracity of the government report r . In other 
words, if the government's signal s is noninformative, then the corresponding report r reflects that 
fact, and the SNGA can verify that the true facts are indeed as they have been reported. In symbols, 
s = 0 ==> r = O. On the other hand, to keep the SNGA' s design problem interesting and to allow for 
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the possibility of government/firm collusion, I shall permit the government to lie and report that its 
signal is noninformative when such is not the case.12 That is, S = e => r E { e, 0 }. This completes 
the description of my model. I now consider the benchmark case in which perfect information is 
acquired by the SNGA. 
3b. The First Best Optimum 
In this case, the SNGA observes e and the firm's abatement choice. When this happens, the 
SNGA bypasses the government and contracts with the firm directly. The government receives its 
reservation transfer Grand hence its reservation utility ~, in all states. The SNGA solves 
. ~ { i + nJ - i( i) - Ti - Gi } max a( ~i a j OJ g a j r r' (1) 
subject to (1 a) li T j - g( a)] z B r , Vi, and (lb) if z ~\ji{ T/ + gi( a/) + G/} . Using the fact that 
the firm participation constraints in (la) hold with equality, the first order necessary conditions are 
dg1( a J/da:- = 1/( 1 + y), 'Vi , j, where y is the multiplier on the budget constraint (1 b) and a* is 
the first best level of pollution abatement. We see that in the first best optimum, the marginal cost 
of pollution abatement for country j is set equal to the reciprocal of one plus the marginal welfare 
of the SNGA's funds. The optimal level of abatement a* is state independent; as such, the firm 
receives a transfer for abating pollution which is also state independent. This transfer is ~ + g * 
where g* == g( aJ. 
It is not possible to definitively determine whether the SNGA's budget constraint binds in 
equilibrium. To see this, note the following. The SNGA's welfare function exhibits constant 
marginal welfare in the authority's own funds . As contrasted to this, the funds spent making 
12In this scenario, lying by the government is restricted to states 1 and 4. Alternately put, reporting the wrong 
state is equivalent to obtaining a noninfonnative signal. 
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transfers do not exhibit constant marginal welfare. As a result, it is possible that in equilibrium, the 
SNGA will disburse only a part of M because the effect of such disbursement on clean air 
production drops below one before the SNGA exhausts M The second case in which the SNGA 
exhausts M before the effect on clean air production drops below one is also possible. Which case 
will prevail depends on the curvatures of the Bl[ e], and particularly the gl( e) functions. In the rest 
of this paper I shall assume that the curvatures of these functions is such that the budget constraints 
bind in equilibrium. From a practical standpoint, this is clearly the more relevant case. I now 
discuss the more interesting cases in which the SNGA cannot determine the realization of e or the 
actual abatement undertaken by the firm. 
4. The No GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case 
4a. Ex Ante Contracting (Identical DCs) 
Since the contracting is ex ante, the SNGA, the government, and the firm share symmetric 
but imperfect infonnation about e. When the government is paid G 1" it obtains its reservation utility 
V1" and hence it is fully insured. Further, since I am not allowing for collusion between the 
government and the firm and because the SNGA can verify the government's report, by paying G1" 
the SNGA obtains the government's information at least cost. This means that the three-tiered 
hierarchy reduces to a two-tiered hierarchy in which the government plays a passive role. 
In this setting, the SNGA solves 
max{T;,a;}~'vf p /a i + ei - T) (2) 
subject to (2a) ~iPiB[J;-g(a)] ~ Br , (2b) ~ -g(a3 ) ~ T2 -g(a2 -~e), (2c) 
~ - g(a2 ) ~ T3 - g(a3 + ~e) , and (2d) ~iPJM -~Vj{ G/ + T/] ~ o. Inequality (2a) is the 
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firm's participation constraint. Inequalities (2b) and (2c) are the firm ' s incentive compatibility 
constraints. These constraints arise because the SNGA has imperfect information about e in states 
2 and 3. These are also the states in which the government's signal s is noninformative. Constraint 
(2b) says that in state 3, the firm should not claim that the state is 2. Similarly, (2c) says that in state 
2, the firm should not claim that the state is 3. Inequality (2d) denotes the SNGA' s budget 
constraint. Note that because all DCs are identical and because there is no aggregate uncertainty, 
it makes sense to have an ex ante budget constraint. If the relevant countries are not identical, (2d) 
will have to be replaced-as in section 4b-by an ex post budget constraint. I can now solve the 
SNGA's problem as stated in (2)-(2d). I am led to 
Theorem 1: The optimal lEA is one in which (i) the SNGA obtains the government's information 
at least cost, (ii) the government's reward is Gr in all states, (iii) the pollution abatement levels 
satisfy q = a3 = a4 > a2 , (iv) the firm transfers satisfy I; > Tl = T4 > T2 , and (v) at the 
optimum, all the constraints except (2c) bind. 
Proof' See the Appendix. 
Theorem 1 describes the pattern of pollution abatement one may expect to observe in my 
stylized N identical DC world. Since the SNGA acquires the government's information in states 1 
and 4 and because this information is verifiable, the firm's abatement is the same in these two states. 
The optimal contract then specifies TI = T4 . On the other hand, in state 2 or 3, the SNGA's 
information is imperfect. To prevent the firm from lying about the true e, the optimal contract now 
specifies T3 > T2 . The optimality of this contract stems in part from the feature that the SNGA 
rewards high abatement with a high monetary transfer and "punishes" low abatement with a low 
transfer. The level of abatement in the low quality state 2 is lower than the level in the other states. 
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This makes it less desirable to abate pollution at a low level in state 3. It is not possible to directly 
compare the abatement levels described in Theorem 1 with the first best level of abatement a*. This 
is because a* depends on the multiplier y, which is specific to the first best problem. 
4b. Ex Post Contracting (Heterogeneous DCs) 
I now consider the case in which all the DCs are heterogeneous. The SNGA is unable to 
contract with the government and the firm in country j until the uncertainty about e has been 
resolved. Once again, with no collusion, the government plays a passive role. It receives its 
reservation utility and hence it is fully insured. The SNGA solves 
max { T}'fv .p(a. + e. - T) 
ai' i I I I I I (3) 
subject to (la), (2b), (2c), and (3a) M- ~'f{ G/ + T{} ~ 0 , \:Ii . 
From (Ia) we see that as opposed to the ex ante case, in this ex post case, it must be 
individually rational for the firm to contract with the SNGA in every state. Put differently, in this 
setting, the SNGA cannot compel the firm to abate pollution if doing so would involve making a 
loss. Inequality (3a) denotes the ex post budget constraints. Because the contracting countries now 
are heterogeneous and because the contracting is ex post, a stronger notion of budget balance-as 
embodied in (3a)-must be used. Inequality (3a) says that when the SNGAs contracts with DCs 
independently, this authority's monetary obligations cannot exceed it regardless of the state. Note 
that this ex post setting is characterized by asymmetric information. The SNGA does not know the 
state of nature; the firm does. The timing of the underlying game now is such that the uncertainty 
is resolved first and then the players contract. In this setting, the optimal contract has the properties 
stated in 
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Theorem 2: The three-tired hierarchy reduces to a two-tiered hierarchy in which (i) the SNGA 
obtains the government's information at least cost, (ii) the government's transfer equals Gr in all 
four states, (iii) for i =1= 2, ai = (g I) -I {P/(Pi + Y i) }, ~ = (g I) -I {P !(P2 + Y 2) - D }, and 
Algi (a l ) =A:$ /(a3) =A$ I (a4) > ~g/(a2)' (IV) J; -g(a3) > ~ - g(al ) = T2 -g(a2) = T4 -g(a4) , 
and (v) at the optimum, all the constraints except (la, i = 3) and (2c) bind. 13 
Proof- See the Appendix. 
I now comment on some aspects of the optimal ex ante and ex post contracts. Inspecting 
Table 1, we notice two important differences. First, in the ex ante case, a l = a3 = a4 > a2, and in the 
ex post case, A1gta l ) =A3g /(a3) =A4gta4» ~gta2) ' where the AiS are weights. These 
weights are functions of the respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers and the state probabilities. In 
particular, we see that whereas the ex ante contract equalizes the actual level of abatement in states 
1, 3, and 4, the ex post contract equalizes the weighted marginal cost of abatement in these three 
states. In both contracts, the level of abatement is lowest in the low abatement quality state 2. 
Second, in the ex ante case, the gross payoffs to the firm-which satisfy J; > TI = T4 > T2 -can be 
characterized explicitly. However, in the ex post case, only the net payoff to the firm can be 
characterized explicitly. These net payoffs satisfy J; -g (a3) > ~ - g( a1 ) = T4 - g (a4) = T2 - g (a2) · 
Because the government' s report is verifiable, and because the government does not collude 
with the firm, optimal insurance for the firm under both regimes requires that 
~ -g(a1 ) = T4 -g(a4)· Further, in these no-collusion cases, incentive problems are limited to 
states 2 and 3. In these states, the optimal contract must reward truth telling. As such, in the ex ante 
case, we have T3> T2, and in the ex post case, we have J; -g(a 3) > T2 - g( a2). Finally, I note that 
13F or exact representations of D and the Ai' see the proof of Theorem 2 in the Appendix. 
Table 1. The No-GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case: Ex Ante versus Ex Post Contracting 
Contracting 
Pollution abatement level 
and pattern 
Transfers to the government 
Payoffs to the polluting fIrm 
Ex Ante Ex Post 
q, Vi q, V i 
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in both cases, ~ - g( a3 ) > T;. - g(al )· This feature of the two contracts tells us that an optimal 
contract will reward truth telling in the high abatement quality state when the government is unable 
to convey an informative report to the SNGA. 
I now proceed to consider the effects of government/firm collusion on the optimal contract 
designed by the SNGA. 
5. The GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case 
Sa. Ex Ante Contracting (Identical DCs) 
Recall that because countries are sovereign, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the actions 
of the government and the firm or enforce the terms of the agreement in the event of a contractual 
breach. Since the SNGA can never acquire the firm's private information and must rely on the 
government's report to design the optimal contract, an efficient contract must not only be 
individually rational and incentive compatible, but it must also be collusion-proof. 14 
14See footnote 9 as well. 
16 
I shall model collusion between the government and the firm as follows . In the ex ante case, 
before the resolution of the uncertainty regarding abatement technology quality and at the time of 
signing the main contract, i.e., the contract between the SNGA, the government, and the firm, the 
firm and the government sign a secondary contract which entails the offer and acceptance of a bribe 
b(. , .) from the firm to its government. This secondary contract is unobservable by the SNGA. The 
bribe is a function of the government's report, r, and the firm's production of clean air, x With the 
offer and acceptance of this bribe, the firm's total transfer becomes {T (. ) - b (r , x ) } and the 
government's total transfer is { G ( • ) + b (r , x) } . 
Collusion by the firm and the government alters the incentives of the various parties and-as 
we shall see-the nature of the optimal contract offered by the SNGA. To see why the firm might 
want to bribe its government in our four-state world, consider state 4. In this state, the government 
is indifferent between reporting that it has observed e and reporting that it has observed O. 
However, the firm would prefer that the government report O. This is one instance in which a clear 
rationale exists for the firm to bribe its government. 
In order to formulate and solve the SNGA's problem when there is collusion, I shall appeal 
to the "equivalence principle" (Tirole 1986, p. 195) and restrict myself to collusion-proof contracts. 
Tirole's method involves imposing constraints in addition to the usual participation and incentive 
compatibility constraints. These additional constraints are designed to preclude government/firm 
collusion and hence make the main contract collusion-proof. Denoting the collusion-proof transfers 
- -
to the government and the firm by G and T, the SNGA solves 
max {G- T- '5'. ,-, .p la . + e. - G. - T.) 
i' i, air- v I I ~ I I I I (4) 
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- - - --
subject to (2a)-(2d), (4a) ~i Pi V( G) ~ V
r
, (4b) Gl + Tl - g( a l ) ~ G2 + T2 - g(a2) , (4c) 
-- -- -- - -
G4 + T4 - g(a J ~ G3 + T3 - g(a3), (4d) G3 + T3 -g(a3) ~ G2 + T2 - g(a2 - L18) , and (4e) 
- - - -
G2 + T2 - g (a 2) ~ G3 + T3 - g (a3 + L18 ) . 
Inequality (4a) is the government's participation constraint. Inequalities (4b) and (4c) are 
the core collusion constraints. Recall that in states 1 and 4 the government's signal s is informative. 
In these two states, the government can hide this fact. Given this, constraints (4b) and (4c) tell us 
that should the firm bribe its government, then the total sum of the transfers less the cost of pollution 
abatement in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than the corresponding totals in states 2 and 3, 
respectively. Finally, (4d) and (4e) tell us that it must not be possible for the government to bribe 
the firm. More specifically, (4d) tells us that in state 3, the government should not be able to bribe 
the firm to abate at the level that is optimal for state 2. Similarly, (4e) tells us that the government 
should not be able to bribe the firm to claim that the state is 3 when it is 2. Solving the SNGA' s 
problem (4) subject to (2a)-(2d), and (4a)-(4e), I can state 
Theorem 3: The optimal contract with government/firm collusion is one in which (i) 
---- ---- --
a l = a3 = a4 > a2, (ii) G4 > G 1 > G2 = G3, (iii) ~ > T4> r;. > T2, (iv) G4 + ~ = G3 + T3, and (v) all 
the constraints except (2c), (4b), and (4e) bind at the optimum. 
Proof· See the Appendix. 
To intuitively verify that the contract described in Theorem 3 is indeed collusion-proof, I 
have to show that constraints (2a)-(2d) and (4a)-(4e) are satisfied. By part (v) of Theorem 3, 
constraints (2a), (2b), (2d), (4a), (4c), and (4d) are satisfied. The proof of Theorem 3 tells us that 
constraints (2c), (4b), and (4e) hold as strict inequalities. Thus the equilibrium contract is 
collusion-proof. 
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Note that the SNGA is worse offwhen the government and the firm collude. This is because 
in the collusion case, the number of binding constraints exceeds the number of binding constraints 
in the no-collusion case. However, if the SNGA does offer the contract with the features described 
in Theorem 3, then his total monetary transfers cannot be altered by changing the government's 
report or the firm's abatement level. As such, the SNGA can be sure that his monetary obligations 
will be those described in Theorem 3. This is so because the equilibrium contract is collusion-proof 
I now comment on some of the noteworthy features of the contract described in Theorem 3. 
From Theorem 3(i) and Table 2 we see that collusion per se has no qualitative effect on the pattern 
of pollution abatement. Note also that it is not possible to be explicit about the deviation in the 
abatement levels specified in Theorem 3 from a*, because this first best level of abatement depends 
on a multiplier that is specific to the first best problem. 
Part (ii) and Table 2 tell us that in the collusion case, the government is rewarded for the 
- -
usefulness of its report. In states 2 and 3, the government reports truthfully. Thus, G2 = G 3 ' On 
the other hand, in order to encourage the government to tell the truth about what it has observed in 
state 4, the government's reward is high; by a similar line of reasoning, the government's reward 
Table 2. Ex Ante Contracting Without and With Collusion 
Contracting Without Collusion With Collusion 
Pollution abatement level and pattern 
- - - -
Transfers to the government q, Vi G4 > G1 > G2 = G3 
Transfers to the polluting firm 
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in state 1 is low. The transfers in states 4 and 1 exceed those in states 2 and 3 because in states 4 
and 1 the government may lie and hence the SNGA has to establish the right incentives. This is in 
contrast to the situation in states 2 and 3 where there is no possibility of lying. This active 
governmental role in the collusion case contrasts with the no-collusion case in which the government 
plays a passive role and receives its reservation transfer in every state. 
Part (iv) of the theorem says that the total payments from the SNGA to the government and 
the firm in states 3 and 4 are equal. However, by part (iii) the transfers to the firm between these 
two states vary. Why is this so? In state 3, the firm can lie about the abatement quality parameter 
that it has observed and the government will not be able to tell the difference between truth telling 
and lying beca~se its signal is noninformative. In order to prevent the firm from lying, the firm ' s 
reward in state 3 is higher. On the other hand in state 4, the government's signal is informative. 
Now the government has to be induced to report truthfully with a higher transfer, and the firm' s 
reward is correspondingly lower. From Table 2, we see that in the no-collusion case, ~ = T1 . This 
is because the SNGA acquires the government's verifiable information at least cost and because the 
- -
government reports truthfully. On the other hand in the collusion case, ~ > Tl holds. This is 
because in the collusion case, the SNGA must create incentives so that the dual objectives of 
preventing collusion and encouraging the firm to act truthfully in the high abatement quality state 
are achieved. 
Finally, part (v) tells us that (4b) does not bind at the optimum. This is because when the 
firm observes the low abatement quality parameter, the government's report does not make a 
difference since the firm voluntarily prefers to abate pollution at the low level. 
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5b. Ex Post Contracting (Heterogeneous DCs) 
I now study the case of heterogeneous DCs in which there is collusion between the DC 
government and the firm. The SNGA is unable to get the relevant players to contract until the 
uncertainty about 8 has been resolved. Denoting the collusion-proof transfers to the government 
- -
and the firm by G and T, the SNGA solves 
max{G f }~ 'vf p . (a . +8 . -G . -T.) 
i' i,a; 1 1 1 1 1 (5) 
-
subject to (Ia), (2b), (2c), (3a), (4b)-(4e), and (Sa) KG) 2 V
r
, Vi . The optimal contract has the 
properties stated in 
- - - -
(iii) G4 > G 1 = G2 = G3 = Gr , and (iv) at the optimum all the constraints except (la, i = 3,4), (2c), 
(4e), and (Sa, i = 4) bind.Is 
Proof" See the Appendix. 
Part (iv) of the theorem tells us that with the exception of (la, i = 3,4), (2c), (4e), and (Sa, 
i = 4), all the other constraints are satisfied. The proof of Theorem 4 tells us that constraints (la, 
i = 3,4), (2c), (4e), and (Sa, i = 4) hold as strict inequalities. Hence, the contract described in 
Theorem 4 is indeed collusion-proof. 
A comparison of the optimal ex ante and ex post contracts when there is government/firm 
collusion can be made with the aid of Table 3. There are four essential differences. First, while the 
ex ante contract equalizes abatement levels in states I, 3, and 4, the ex post contract equalizes the 
15For an exact representation of D and the ~, see the proof of Theorem 4 in the Appendix. 
Table 3. The GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Contracting 
Contracting 
Pollution abatement level and 
pattern 
Transfers to the government 
Ex Ante 
- - - -
G4> q >G2 = G3 
Ex Post 
- - - -
G4 > Gj =G2 =G3 = Gr 
- - - -
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Payoffs to the polluting firm ~ - g(a 3 ) > T4 - g(a4) > Tj - g(a 1) = T2 - g( a2 ) 
weighted marginal cost of abatement in these three states. The weights Ai are functions of the state 
probabilities and the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. Second, while the ex ante contract specifies 
---- ----
G4 > G 1 > G 2 = G 3' the ex post contract specifies G4 > G 1 = G 2 = G 3 . In both cases, the 
government's signal is noninformative in states 2 and 3. As such, the optimal ex ante and ex post 
- -
contracts specify G2 = G 3. Further, the government can lie about its signal in states 1 and 4. In 
- -
order to induce truth telling by the risk-averse government, both optimal contracts specify G4 > G 1. 
- -
Third, In the ex ante case, ~ > T4> Tl> T2, whereas In the ex post case, 
- - - -
~ - g( a3 ) > T4 - g( aJ = Tl - g(a1 ) = T2 - g( a2 ) · In both cases, the highest gross and net payments, 
respectively, are in state 3. This encourages the firm to tell the truth about 8 when the government 
is unable to convey an informative report to the SNGA. Finally, while in the ex ante case, 6 
constraints-(2a), (2b), (2d), (4a), (4c), and (4d)-bind at the optimum, in the ex post case, 13 
constraints-CIa, i ;/= 4), (2b), (3a), (4b), (4c), (4d), and (Sa, i ;/= 4)-bind at the optimum. This 
means that the SNGA's expected welfare when he designs country specific lEA's can be no greater 
than when he designs a single contract for all the relevant DCs. This also tells us that when there 
is government/firm collusion, the SNGA will prefer to design a single contract rather than N 
country-specific contracts. 
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Finally, consider the differences in the optimal ex post contract, without and with collusion. 
The essential features of these two contracts are illustrated in Table 4. From this table, we see that 
collusion has no qualitative impact on the pattern of equilibrium pollution abatement. However, the 
quantitative impact is almost certainly different because, in general, the weights Ai and 4, will be 
- -
unequal. The transfers to the government are almost unchanged; the only change- G4 > G 1 in the 
collusion case-reflects the need to establish incentives so that the government reports truthfully 
in the high abatement quality state 4. The net payoff to the firm in both contracting regimes exhibits 
the same qualitative pattern. In the collusion case though, the transfers are designed so that the 
equilibrium contract is collusion-proof. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper I analyzed the question of environmental protection for identical and 
heterogeneous DCs within the framework of the directives set forth in the various agreements 
reached at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. I modeled the institutional setting for the underlying 
Table 4. Ex Post Contracting Without and With Collusion 
Contracting 
Pollution abatement 
level and pattern 
Transfers to the 
government 
Net payoffs to the 
polluting fInn 
Without Collusion 
q., \Ii 
With Collusion 
- - - -
G4> G) =G2 =G3 = Gr 
- - -
~ - g(a 3 ) > T) - g(a)) > T2 - g(a 2) 
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problem as a three-tiered hierarchy with N forks, and then I studied the nature of the optimal, budget 
balanced ex ante and ex post contracts, without and with collusion. A number of policy conclusions 
emerge. 
First, although it is generally more desirable to account for the heterogeneity of Des by 
designing country-specific lEAs, the SNGA will prefer not to do so. Alternately put, the SNGA will 
prefer to treat Des as identical and design a single contract. This is because the SNGA' s payoff, 
when he contracts ex ante, is typically higher than his payoff when he contracts with the various 
Des ex post. However, it should be noted that in the context of Des, unless the SNGA can limit the 
ex post liability of the players, nations may well refuse to participate in ex ante contracting schemes. 
This tells us that there is a potential conflict between the kind of lEA a SNGA is likely to want and 
the kind of lEA that is likely to be favored by Des. 
Second, because of the nature of the lEA design problem, and because most of the incentive 
constraints and all the budget constraints bind, we typically cannot expect that the SNGA's designed 
contracts will elicit the first best level of abatement. However, this question cannot be definitively 
resolved because the contractually specified abatement levels cannot be directly compared across 
the five contracting scenarios. 
Third, the qualitative features of the optimal lEAs depend on the timing of the underlying 
game between the SNGA, the government, and the firm. Whereas in the ex ante case, the pattern 
of abatement and the gross payoffs to the government and the firm can be characterized explicitly, 
such is not the case in the ex post case. Further, while the ex ante contract equalizes abatement 
levels in three of the four states, the ex post contract equalizes the weighted marginal cost of 
abatement in these three states. This means that if the SNGA cannot get the relevant parties to 
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contract ex ante, the resulting contract will be more complex. In this more complex contract, the 
level of pollution abatement will depend on the marginal welfare of the SNGA's funds and on the 
state probabilities. 
Fourth, several observers, such as Rogers (1993, p. 236), have worried that many of the Earth 
Summit directives". . . offer a back door option by which signatories can excuse themselves at a 
later date if the going gets too tough." The implementability of ex post contracts should diminish 
such concerns because an ex post contract can be viewed as a limited liability contract. In this sense, 
as compared to an ex ante contract, an ex post contract is more likely to be renegotiation proof. 
Fifth, the research of this paper tells us that a SNGA can indeed circumvent the monitoring 
and enforcement problem stemming from national sovereignty by designing collusion-proof 
contracts. 
With talk of rising disparity between the South and the North and the increasingly 
acrimonious nature of international discussions regarding the use of environmental resources, the 
design question studied in this paper takes on a particular significance. This is in no small measure 
due to the fact that the implementation of such agreements will do more to engender and maintain 
international security than will most strategic or unilateral policy measures. 
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Appendix 
In this appendix, I provide the proofs of the four theorems stated in the text of the paper. All 
the proofs involve Kuhn-Tucker analysis. 
Proof of Theorem 1: I shall proceed by means often steps. The Lagrangian to (2)-(2d) is16 
~ = J:vjpj(xj-T)+ afVj pIJ[e]-B ,.}+ P{T3-g(e)- T2 +g(e)} 
y {~\i Pi [M -~\?f { G,! + T/} ]}, (a) 
where a, p, and yare the multipliers corresponding to (2a), (2b), and (2d), respectively. The 
first -order necessary conditions are (a1) (a2) 
a{aB[eyaJ;} = 1+(P/p2) +y , (a3) a{aB[e]/aT3} = 1-(Pp3) +y , (a4) a{aB[e]/aT4} = l+y , 
( a 5 ) <E t e ]g I (a 1) = 1, ( a 6 ) aB t e ] g I ( a2 ) = 1 + ( pp 2)g I (a 2 - Ll8 ) , ( A 7) 
[aBte]+(pp3)]g/(a 3) = 1, and (a8) aBte]g l(a4 )= 1 . 
Step 1: (2d) binds at the optimum. 
Proof' This follows by assumption. See the related discussion in section 3b . • 
Step 2: (2a) binds at the optimum. 
Proof' From (a1) a = 0 ~ y = -1. This is impossible. Thus a> O . • 
Proof' (a1) and (a4) give T;. -g(a1 )= T4-g(a 4)· Using this and manipulating (a5) and (a8), I get q = a4 · 
Now it follows that T;. = T4 · • 
Step 4: (2b) binds at the optimum. 
161 shall check later to see that (2c) is satisfied. 
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Proof" P=0,(a2),and(a3)tellusthat ~ -g(a 3) = T2 -g(a2 ). Usingthisequalityin(2b)gives 
0> g ( a2 ) - g( a2 - 118). This is impossible. Thus, p > 0 . • 
Step 5: a4 >a2 . 
Proof" (a4) and (a8) give (1 + y)g I (a 4) = 1 . (a2) and (a6) tell me that (1 + y)g I (a 2) < 1. From 
these two expressions, I get g l (a 4) > g I ( a2) =* a 4 > a2 . • 
Step 6: a3 = a4 . 
Proof" From (a3), (a4), (a7), and (a8), I get (1 + y)g l(a3) = (1 + y)g l(a4) =* a3 = a4 .• 
Step 7: ~ > T2 . 
Proof" This claim follows because p > 0, and a3 > a 2' • 
Step 8: ~ > Tl . 
Proof" (a1) and (a3) give ~ - g( a3 ) > Tl - g( a l )· Because q = a3 , I conclude that ~ > T1 · • 
Step 9: ~ > T2 . 
Proof" (a2) and (a4) give ~ - g(a~ > T2 - g(a2)" Because ~ > a2, it follows that ~ > T2 . • 
Step 10: q = a3 = a4 >a2" 
Proof" This follows from steps 3,5, and 6 .• 
Finally, I shall check to see that (2c) is satisfied. This is equivalent to showing that 
g(a3 + 118) - g( a3 ) > g( a2) - g( a2 - 118) . This inequality holds because q > a2, 118 > 0, 
g l > 0, and g il> 0 " This completes the proof of Theorem 1. •• 
Proof of Theorem 2: I shall proceed by means of seven steps.17 The Lagrangian is 
S£ = ~ViP/ Xi - T) + ~Vi (Xi {B[. ] - B r} + P { T3 - g(. ) - T2 + g ( • ) } + ~Vi Y J M - ~Vi { G j" + 7;i} ], (b) 
17r shall check later to see that (2c) is satisfied. 
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where q, p, Y i' i = 1, . .. ,4 are the multipliers corresponding to (Ia), (2b), and (3a), respectively. 
The first -order necessary conditions are (b 1) C1 { aB [ e ]I aT1 } = Y 1 + PI' (b2) 
~ {aB[eyaT2} = P + Y2 +P2' (b3) ~ {aB[eyaT3} = Y3 - P +P3' (b4) a4{ aB [e]/a~} = Y4 +P4' and 
(b 5 ) alB I [ e ] g I ( a1 ) = P l' (b 6 ) ~ B I [ e] g I ( a2) = pg I (a 2 - Lie ) + P 2 ' (b 7) 
{af3 I[ e] + P} g/(a3) = P3' and (b8) ~BI[e]g1 (a 4) = P4. 
Step 1: The budget constraints bind at the optimum. 
Proof· This follows by assumption. See the related discussion in section 3b .• 
Step 2: For i::l= 3, ai > o. 
Proof· From (b 1) C1 = 0 =* Y 1 = -PI' which is impossible. Thus C1 > 0 . From (b2) 
~ = 0 =* Y 2 = -(p2 + P), which is impossible, irrespective of whether P ~ o. Thus, ~ > o. From 
(b4) a4 = 0 =* Y 4 = -P4' which is impossible. Thus a4 > o .• 
Step 3: (2b) binds at the optimum. 
Proof· From (b3) P = 0 =* a3> o. Using this result in (2b) gives 0> g(a2) - g(a 2 - Lie). This 
is impossible. Thus, P > o . • 
Step 4: (1 a, i = 3) is slack at the optimum. 
Proof· ~ > 0 , P > 0 tell us that ~ - g ( a3) = T2 - g ( a2 ) + { g( a2 ) - g ( a2 - Lie ) } = ~. + { D}, D> o. 
In turn, this tells us that ~ - g(a3 ) > Tr =*a 3 = o . • 
Step 5: ~ -g(a3 ) > T1 -g(a 1) = I;. -g(a2) = T4 -g(a4) · 
Proof· This follows because C1 > 0, cx 2 > 0, a 3 = 0 , cx4 > o. • 
Step 6: For i::l=2, ai = (gl)-l {p/(pi +y)}, a2 = (gIrl {P;(P2 + Y2) -D}, 
D = {P ~ (P2 +Y 2) - g I ( a2 ) } . 
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Proof· From (bI) and (b5) I get q = (gIrl {p/(Pl +y l )} . From (b3) and (b7) I get 
~ =(gl) - 1{P~(P3+Y3)}' From(b4) and (b8), I get a4= (gl) -1{P:(P4+Y4 )}' Finally, from (b2) 
and (b6) I get ~ = (g l) -1 {p;(P2+y2)-D} .• 
Step 7: ~gl(al) =A3g l(a3) =A$/(a4»~gl(a2)' where Ai = {I +(y:p)} . 
Proof· From the proof to step 6, it follows that {I +(Y~2)} g I( a2) < 1 = {I +( y:p)}g I (a) , 
i=I,3 , 4 .• 
Finally, I shall check to see that (2c) is satisfied. This can be verified in a manner analogous 
to that employed in the proof of Theorem 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 2 . •• 
Proof of Theorem 3: I shall proceed by means of 13 steps. The Lagrangian is 18 
- -
~ = ~ViPi(Xi -Gi -T) + u{~ViPiV(e) - Vr } +a{~ViPiB[e] -B,.} 
- - - - --
+ p {T3 - g (e) - T2 + g (e )} + E { G 4 + T4 - g ( e) - G 3 - T3 + g ( e ) } + 
K{G3 +~ -gee) -G2 -~ +g(e)} +Y{~\t Pi [M-~Vj {G/ +T/}]}, (e) 
where v, a, p, E, K, and yare the multipliers corresponding to (4a), (2a), (2b), (4c), (4d), and (2d), 
respectively. The first -order necessary conditions are ( c 1 ) uV I ( G 1 ) = 1 + y , ( c2) 
tV/ (G2) = 1 +y +(K/P2) , (c3) tV/ (G3) = 1 +y +(E - K) lp 3' (c4) tV /(G4) = 1 +y - (E lp4), 
(c5) aaB[eya~ = 1 + y, (c6) c8B[e]/aT2 = 1 + Y +( P +K)lp2' (c7) aaB[eyaT; = 1 +y +(E- P -K)lp3' 
( c 8 ) ( c 9 ) ( cIa) 
aB I[e]gl(a2) = 1 +{(P +K) lp2 }gl(a2-Ll8), (cII) {aBI[e] + (P -E + K)P3}gl(a3) = 1, and(cI2) 
{aBte] +Elp4}g l(a4) = 1. 
Step 1: (2d) binds at the optimum. 
Proof· This follows by assumption. See the related discussion in section 3b . • 
181 omit (2c), (4b), and (4e) temporarily. Later, I shall check to see that these constraints are satisfied. 
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Step 2: (4a) binds at the optimum. 
Proof· Substituting u = 0 in (e 1) yields y = -1. This is impossible. Thus, U > o .• 
Step 3: (2a) binds at the optimum. 
Proof· Substituting ex = 0 in (e5) gives y = -1 . This is impossible. Thus, ex > o .• 
Step 4: (2b) binds at the optimum. 
- - - - -
From (2b) I get ~ - g( a3) ~ T2 - g( a2 - ~e) > T2 - g( a2 )· Substituting this in (eI3), I get G3 >G2 . 
- - - -
Using ~ >G2 and ~ -g(a3) > ~ - g(a2) I get K = O. Now (e6) and (e7) give 
- -
~ - g ( a2 ) > T3 - g ( a3) · This last inequality violates (2b) . Thus, P > o . • 
Step 5: (4d) binds at the optimum. 
Proof- Recall that p > o. K = 0, (e2), and (e3) tell us that V( ( 3 ) > Vi (G2 ) =?G3 < G2 . This is 
- -
impossible. Thus, K> 0 =? G 3 = G 2. • 
Step 6: (4e) binds at the optimum. 
Proof- E = 0, (e2), (e3), and ~ = G3 tell us that UVI( ( 2 ) ;/= u Vi (G3 ). This is impossible. Thus, 
E >0 .• 
- -
Step 7: G4 > G 1 . 
Proof- E > 0, (el), and (e4) tell us that V (G4 ) < V I(G1 ) =? G4 > G1 . • 
Step 8: a1 =a3 = a4 = (g /r 1{ 1/( 1 +y)}. 
Proof· From (e5) and (e9) I get q = (girl {1/( 1 + y)} . From (e7) and (ell) I get 
~ = (g I) - 1 { 1/(1 +y)} . From (e8) and (e 12) I get ~ = (g I r 1 { 1/( 1 +y ) } . • 
Step 9: a2 < ai' i = 1, 3 ,4 . 
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Proof· From (c5) and (c9) I get (1 + Y )gl (a 1) = 1. From (c6) and (cl0) I get (1 + Y )gl (a 2) < 1. 
From these two expressions it follows that gl ( a2) < g I ( a1 ) => a2 < a1. • 
- -
Step 10: G1 > G2 . 
Proof· (cl) and (c2), gIve V( 01 ) = (1 + y)/u, and V (02 ) = { (1 +y )/u} + K!P2U . Since 
VI (.) < 0, it follows that ~ > O2 , • 
- - - -
Step 11: G4 > G 1 > G 2 = G 3 . 
Proof· This follows from steps 5, 7, and 10 .• 
- - - -
Step 12: G4 + T4 = G3 + T3 · 
Proof· This follows because E > 0, and a3 =a4 . 
- - - -
Step 13: ~ > T4 > TI > T2· 
- - - - - -
Proof· (c5), (c6), (c8), and B"[.] < 0 give ~ - g( a4) > Tl - g(a 1) > T2 - g( a2) => T4 > Tl > T2· 
- - - -
Combining this with steps 11 and 12 yields ~ > T4> Tl > ~ . • 
Finally, I need to check that (2c), (4b), and (4e) are satisfied. The fact that (2c) holds as a 
strict inequality can be verified in a manner analogous to that employed in the proof of Theorem 1. 
- - - -
Given this, ( 4e) also holds as a strict inequality because G2 = G 3 ' Finally, ( 4b ) is satisfied because G1 > G 2 
- -
and because r;. -g ( a1 ) > ~ - g( a2 ) . This completes the proof of Theorem 3 . •• 
Proof of Theorem 4: I shall proceed by means of 13 steps. The Lagrangian is 19 
- - - -
~ = ~\iiP i( Xi - Gi - T) + ~\iP: i {B [.] - Br } + ~\iYi { V(.) - ~.} +P { T3 - g (.) - T2 + g (. ) } + 
(d) 
19r will check later to see that (2c) and ( 4e) are satisfied. 
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where a i' V i' p, El' K , Yi , i = 1 , 2,3, 4, 1= 1, 2 are the multipliers associated with (la), (Sa), 
(2b), (4b), (4c), (4d), and (3a), respectively. The first-order necessary conditions are 
(dl) qVI(G I ) =PI-EI +Yl' (d2) V2VI«]2)=P2+EI+K+Y2' (d3)v3VI(G3)=P3+E2-K+Y3' 
-
( d S ) <1 { aB [ e ]I aTl } = PI - E I + Y 1 ' 
- -
(d6) ~{aB[e]laT2} = P2 +P +E l +K+ Y2, (d7) ~ {aB[e]laT3} = P3 +E 2 - P - K + Y3 , 
-
( d 8 ) a4 {a B [e ] fa T4 } = P 4 - ~ + Y 4 ' ( d 9 ) 
( d 1 0) {a j1 I [e ] - EI } g I ( a2) = P 2 + { P + K} g I ( a2 - ~ e ), (d 11) {a jJ I [e ] + P - E2 + K} g I ( a3) = P 3' 
and (d 12) {a fl I [e ] + E 2 } g I ( a 4) = P 4 . 
Step 1: The budget constraints bind at the optimum. 
Proof· This follows by assumption. See the related discussion in section 3b . • 
Step 2: (Sa, i = 2) and (la, i = 2) bind at the optimum. 
Proof· From (d2) l1 = 0 => Y 2 = -(p2 + E I + K). This is impossible irrespective of whether ~ ~ 0 
and K~ O. Thus, l1 > 0 . From (d6) ~ = 0 => Y 2 = -(p2 + P + EI + K ) . This is impossible 
irrespective of whether P ~ 0 , E I ~ 0 , and K~ O. Thus, ~ > O. • 
Step 3: (Sa, i = 1) and (la, i = 1) bind at the optimum. 
Proof· (d 1) tells us that q = EI = 0 is impossible. (d 1) and (dS) tell us that either (i) <1 = VI = 0, 
or (ii) a?O, VI >0. If (i) holds, then (4b) is slack and ~ = O. But this is impossible. Thus, 
<1 > 0, VI > O . • 
Step 4: (Sa, i = 3) binds at the optimum. 
Proof· Substituting this In (d7), I get 
~B I[ e] +P = 0 => a3 = P = O. If the state 3 participation and the incentive compatibility constraints 
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-
are slack at the optimum, then the SNGA can increase his welfare by lowering ~. But this violates Y3 > o. 
Thus, ~ >0 . • 
Step 5: (2b) binds at the optimum. 
Proof· If P = 0, then (d3) and (d7) tell us that ~>O . Using this In (2b) yields 
0> g(a2) - g(a 2 -d8) . This is impossible. Thus, P > O . • 
Step 6: (4d) binds at the optimum. 
- - - -
Proof· P>0~T3-g(a3)= T2 -g(a2-d8). Because G2 =G3, IconcludethatK>O . • 
Step 7: (1 a, i = 3) is slack at the optimum. 
- -
Proof· P>O, a2>0~T3-g(a3) =T2-g(a2)+{g(a2)-g(a2-d8)} = ~.+{D}, D>O . Intum, 
-
this tells us that ~ - g( a3) > Tr ~a3 = o .• 
Step 8: (1 a, i = 4) and (5a, i = 4) are slack at the optimum. 
Proof· (d4) and (d8) tell us that either (i) 0:4> 0, U 4> 0, or (ii) 0:4 = U4 = O. If (i) holds, then (4c) 
is violated. Thus, 0:4 = u4 = o .• 
- - - -
Step 9: G4 > G1 = G2 = G3 = Gr . 
Proof· This follows because 'i > 0, u2 > 0, u3 > 0, u4 = o . • 
Step 10: (4b) and (4e) bind at the optimum. 
- - - -
Step 11: ~-g(a3»T4-g(aJ>Tl-g(al) =T2 -g(a2 )· 
Proof· This follows because a4 = 0, 0:1 > 0, 0:2 > 0 , E 2 > O. • 
Step 12: For 
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Proof' From (d5) and (d9), (d7) and (d11), and (d8) and (d12), I get 
q=(g / rl{p/(pj+Y)}, i= 1,3,4. From(d6)and(d10),I geta2=(g l)-I{p/(p2 +y2)-D} . • 
Step 13: A1g1(a1 ) =A-~ I (a3 ) = A-¢' I (a 4) = 1 > ~gl(a2)' A-j = {I +( Yip)}. 
Proof' From (d5) and (d9), (d7) and (d11), and (d8) and (d12), I get 
{I + ( Y / P2) } g I ( a2) < 1. Hence, the claim follows .• 
I now check to see that (2c) and (4e) are satisfied. The satisfaction of (2c) can be verified 
as in the proof of Theorem 1. Having shown that (2c) is satisfied, to verify that (4e) is satisfied, it 
- -
suffices to note that from step 9, G2 = G 3' This completes the proof of Theorem 4 .•• 
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